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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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____________ 
 
No. 07-2151 
____________ 
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Stanley J. Caterbone, Appellant 
____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-05012) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody 
____________ 
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March 17, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 4, 2011) 
____________ 
 
Stanley J. Caterbone, Pro se 
Advanced Media Group 
1250 Fremont Street 
Lancaster, PA 17603 
 
William Kanter, Esq. 
Jeffrica J. Lee, Esq. 
Appellate Staff, Civil Division, Room 7537 
Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 
Washington, DC 20530-0001 
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Catherine L. Sakach, Esq. 
Court Appointed Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Court 
Duane Morris LLP 
1940 Route 70 East 
Cherry Hill, NJ 08003 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 This case involves an untimely notice of appeal to the 
District Court after the Bankruptcy Court‟s dismissal, for 
cause, of a Chapter 11 petition.  The question before us is 
whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, an untimely filing such as the 
one at issue here deprives subsequent reviewing courts—here, 
both the District Court and this Court—of jurisdiction over 
the appeal.  We conclude that it does.  Accordingly, we will 
dismiss the instant appeal and remand to the District Court 
with instructions to dismiss the appeal to it from the 
Bankruptcy Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
I.  Background 
 Appellant Stanley J. Caterbone filed a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition in May 2005.  The United States Trustee 
subsequently moved to dismiss the petition for cause, and the 
Bankruptcy Court granted the motion on October 3, 2006, 
citing various substantive and procedural deficiencies.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 1112(b).   
 
The order of dismissal was mailed to Caterbone by 
first class mail on October 5, 2006.  On October 16, he sent a 
notice of appeal by first class mail and electronic mail.  
However, the notice of appeal was filed with the District 
Court on October 19, rendering it untimely because it 
occurred outside the ten-day window, then in place, for filing 
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a notice of appeal.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) (2006).
1
  It 
is undisputed that Caterbone did not file a “request to extend 
the time for filing a notice of appeal … by written motion … 
before the time for filing a notice of appeal ha[d] expired,” 
nor did the Bankruptcy Court grant such an extension 
following “a motion filed not later than 20 days after the 
expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal … upon a 
showing of excusable neglect.”  Id. 8002(c)(2). 
 
Despite its untimely filing, Caterbone‟s appeal was 
docketed in the District Court on November 14, and the 
Trustee did not argue that it was untimely.  On March 15, 
2007, the Court sua sponte dismissed the appeal, citing 
Caterbone‟s failure to comply with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006, 
which requires that a petitioner designate “items to be 
included in the record on appeal and a statement of the issues 
to be presented.”  Caterbone appealed to this Court.  Shortly 
thereafter, the Trustee moved to dismiss the appeal, citing, for 
the first time, Caterbone‟s initial untimely notice of appeal, 
and arguing that, as a result of the untimely filing, the District 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Following various intervening events, including the 
appointment of amicus curiae, the case is now before us.  The 
Trustee argues that, consistent with Bowles v. Russell, 551 
                                                 
1
 In amending Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a), effective 
December 1, 2009, to expand the time for filing a notice of 
appeal to fourteen days, the Supreme Court‟s accompanying 
Order provided that the amendment “shall govern in all 
proceedings in bankruptcy cases thereafter commenced and, 
insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.”  
Supreme Court of the United States, Order Amending Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Mar. 26, 2009).  The Trustee 
argues that the “just and practicable” rationale is inapplicable 
here.  Moreover, the Trustee notes that Caterbone‟s notice of 
appeal was dated, but not filed, on October 16, and argues, 
persuasively in our view, that even if the expanded period 
were to apply, the notice of appeal was still untimely because 
it was filed the sixteenth day after entry of the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s order. 
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U.S. 205 (2007), Section 158(c)(2) established a mandatory, 
jurisdictional deadline that statutorily encompasses Rule 
8002(a)‟s specified timeline for appealing the judgment of a 
bankruptcy court, such that the timeline is not akin to a 
freestanding, waivable “claim-processing rule” within the 
meaning of Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004).  Amicus 
argues similarly.  Caterbone, on the other hand, elides the 
Bowles analysis and argues, inter alia, that his untimely filing 
should be addressed, and excused, under the standard of 
“excusable neglect” set forth in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. 
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993).   
 
For the reasons explained below, we hold that the 
prescribed timeline within which an appeal from a bankruptcy 
court must be filed is mandatory and jurisdictional, thus 
affirming, in light of Bowles, the rule that we applied in 
Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3d 
Cir. 1997).   
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 Jurisdiction is the threshold issue in this case, and we 
must address its relevance both to the decision rendered by 
the District Court, and to our review of that decision.  Thus, 
as an initial matter, we note that we have jurisdiction over the 
final decision that the District Court rendered on Caterbone‟s 
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court.  28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).  
Our authority includes reviewing whether the District Court‟s 
own exercise of jurisdiction, per § 158(a), was proper.  That 
is because “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a 
court‟s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or 
waived[, such that courts] … have an independent obligation 
to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even 
in the absence of a challenge from any party.”  Arbaugh v. Y 
& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).   
 
Ordinarily, we apply plenary review to final orders of 
a district court sitting as an appellate court reviewing the 
decision of a bankruptcy court.  In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 
129 F.3d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1997).  However, following from 
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our obligation to determine the threshold issue of subject 
matter jurisdiction, see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514, and where, 
as here, a party “contest[s] our jurisdiction and that of the 
District Court, … [w]e exercise de novo review over [the] 
question[] of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  This is the case even where, again as here, a 
district court “exercis[es its] jurisdiction” and dismisses a 
cause of action for some other reason.  Id.  If our independent 
review yields the conclusion that the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal from the 
Bankruptcy Court, the appropriate disposition is dismissal of 
the appeal.  In re Caribbean Tubular Corp., 813 F.2d 533, 
535 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that where it is found that a 
district court lacked appellate jurisdiction over a bankruptcy 
court order, the court of appeals must dismiss the appeal to it, 
and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate its 
order and to dismiss the appeal from the bankruptcy court).   
 
III.  Discussion 
 An appeal from a decision of a bankruptcy court is 
subject to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2), which 
provides that appeals “shall be taken in the same manner as 
appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts 
of appeals from the district courts and in the time provided by 
Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy Rules.”  When Caterbone filed 
his appeal, that rule provided, in relevant part, that “notice of 
appeal shall be filed with the clerk within 10 days of the date 
of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from.”  
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) (2006).   
 
Although Kontrick affirmed as “„axiomatic‟” the 
proposition that requirements contained in a bankruptcy rule 
alone are not jurisdictional (and, hence, are waivable), 540 
U.S. at 453 (citation omitted), Section 158 provides the 
statutory basis for the courts‟ jurisdiction over bankruptcy 
appeals.  See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) & (d) (specifying 
circumstances of “district courts[‟] … jurisdiction to hear 
appeals” and the “courts of appeals[‟] … jurisdiction”).  
Because Section 158 also specifies the time within which an 
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appeal must be taken—i.e., “in the time provided by Rule 
8002”—that requirement is jurisdictional.  As Bowles 
clarified, both acknowledging and distinguishing Kontrick, 
“the taking of an appeal within [a statutorily] prescribed time 
is mandatory and jurisdictional.”  551 U.S. at 209 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Accordingly, “failure 
to file [a] notice of appeal in accordance with the statute 
therefore deprive[s] … [courts] of jurisdiction[, and bars a 
party from] … rely[ing] on forfeiture or waiver to excuse [a] 
lack of compliance with the statute‟s time limitations.”  Id. at 
213 (citation omitted).   
 
Here, even though it is a bankruptcy rule that specifies 
the time within which an appeal must be filed, the statutory 
incorporation of that rule renders its requirement statutory 
and, hence, jurisdictional and non-waivable.  As the Supreme 
Court recently observed, while “the distinction between 
jurisdictional conditions [i.e., à la Bowles] and claim-
processing rules [i.e., à la Kontrick] can be confusing in 
practice[,] … Bowles stands for the proposition that context, 
including th[e] Court‟s interpretation of similar provisions in 
many years past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks a 
requirement as jurisdictional.”  Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243, 1247-48 (2010).   
 
Beyond the fact that the statutory text of Section 
158(c)(2) incorporates a time condition, historical context 
also supports our holding.  Prior to Kontrick and Bowles, we 
regarded Rule 8002(a)‟s time limit for filing a notice of 
appeal as jurisdictional.  See Shareholders, 109 F.3d at 879; 
Whitemere Dev. Corp., Inc. v. Cherry Hill Twp., 786 F.2d 
185, 187 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Universal Minerals, Inc., 755 
F.2d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1985).  Kontrick—and, later, Eberhart 
v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005)—arguably provided the 
opportunity to question whether this rule remained correct.  
That being said, a careful reading of Kontrick, Bowles, and 
Reed Elsevier confirms that the rule we affirmed in 
Shareholders, Whitemere, and Universal Minerals remains 
the rule today.   
 
In holding that time constraints for objecting to a 
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discharge in bankruptcy are non-jurisdictional “claim-
processing rules,” Kontrick noted that Congress‟s statutory 
grant of jurisdiction to the courts to adjudicate discharges in 
bankruptcy contains no reference to a time condition.  540 
U.S. at 452-53 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(I), and 
(b)(2)(J)).
2
  To the contrary, in holding that the statutorily-
prescribed time provision for filing an appeal in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding is jurisdictional, Bowles expressly 
stated: “Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice 
of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”  551 
U.S. at 214.  Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Arbaugh 
could be read to state that a clear statement rule applies to 
Congress‟s identification of a statutory limitation as 
jurisdictional, see 546 U.S. at 515-16,
3
 Reed Elsevier more 
recently clarified that, again à la Bowles,  
 
the relevant question … is not … whether [a 
particular statutory provision] itself has long 
                                                 
2
 Likewise, in Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 16, 21, the Court 
concluded that time provisions in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure were non-jurisdictional, and thus 
waivable.  In Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515, the Court concluded 
that a numerical provision affecting Title VII claims, but 
which was separate from Title VII‟s jurisdictional provision, 
thereby was not jurisdictional. 
 
3
  As the Court stated in Arbaugh: 
[W]e think it the sounder course to refrain from 
constricting § 1331 or Title VII‟s jurisdictional 
provision, and to leave the ball in Congress‟ 
court.  If the Legislature clearly states that a 
threshold limitation on a statute‟s scope shall 
count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants 
will be duly instructed and will not be left to 
wrestle with the issue.  But when Congress does 
not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as 
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction 
as nonjurisdictional in character. 
546 U.S. at 515-16 (internal citations and reference 
omitted). 
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been labeled jurisdictional, but whether the type 
of limitation that [it] imposes is one that is 
properly ranked as jurisdictional absent an 
express designation.  The statutory limitation in 
Bowles was of a type that we had long held did 
“speak in jurisdictional terms” even absent a 
“jurisdictional” label, and nothing about [that 
provision‟s] text or context, or the historical 
treatment of that type of limitation, justified a 
departure from this view. 
 
130 S. Ct. at 1248. 
 It is evident, in light of Shareholders, Whitemere, and 
Universal Minerals, that we “ha[ve] long held” that Section 
158(c)(2)‟s incorporation of the filing timeline specified in 
Rule 8002(a) “speak[s] in jurisdictional terms[,] even absent a 
jurisdictional label, and [that] nothing about [its] text or 
context, or [its] historical treatment … justifie[s] a departure 
from this view.”  See Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1248.  
Because it was both prior to and shortly after Reed Elsevier 
that we affirmed in non-precedential opinions that the time 
requirement for filing a bankruptcy appeal is jurisdictional, 
we now take the occasion to so hold in a precedential 
opinion.
4
  Doing so comports with the fact that, unlike the 
rules that Eberhart and Kontrick held were non-jurisdictional, 
Rule 8002(a)‟s time limit is rooted in a congressionally-
enacted statute.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002, advisory 
committee note (noting that “th[e] rule is an adaptation of” 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)); see also Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212, 213 
(“[A] statute-based filing period for civil cases is 
jurisdictional. . . . Because Congress decides whether federal 
courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and 
under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.  Put 
another way, the notion of subject-matter jurisdiction 
obviously extends to … when Congress prohibits federal 
courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate class of 
                                                 
4
  For purposes of reference only, we note In re Taylor, 
343 F. App‟x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2009), and In re Jacobowitz, 
384 F. App‟x 93, 94 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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cases after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment.” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  Taking all 
of this into consideration, we conclude that the rule we 
enunciated in Shareholders remains good law.
5
   
 
Given the fact that subject matter jurisdiction over 
Caterbone‟s appeal to the District Court was, and is, 
lacking—and that jurisdictional defect also bars us from 
reviewing the merits of his appeal to us—we need not address 
the Court‟s dismissal of his appeal for failure to prosecute.  
Nor need we address Caterbone‟s argument that his 
“excusable neglect” saves his untimely filing, given the clear 
text of Rule 8002 and the guidance of Shareholders:   
 
Rule 8002(c) … requires that even in cases of 
excusable neglect, the issue must be raised and 
the appeal filed within the … window of Rule 
8002 (Rule 8002(a)‟s [timeline] for the appeal + 
8002(c)‟s [timeline] for the extension).  The 
rule does not allow a party to claim excusable 
neglect after the [time period] ha[s] expired. 
 
109 F.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted).  Finally, we 
decline to address Caterbone‟s remaining arguments, because 
they do not pertain to the threshold issue of jurisdiction.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the instant 
appeal and remand to the District Court with instructions to 
dismiss Caterbone‟s appeal from the Bankruptcy Court for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   
                                                 
5
  Our conclusion is consistent with the holdings of our 
sister circuits that have affirmed that the filing timeline for 
bankruptcy appeals is jurisdictional.  See In re Latture, 605 
F.3d 830, 837 (10th Cir. 2010); In re Wiersma, 483 F.3d 933, 
938 (9th Cir. 2007); In re B.A.R. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 2010 
WL 4595554 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2010) (citing In re Siemon, 
421 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
